
First, the logic claiming that oil addiction is a purely political or economic decision is a kind of farce that looks down on economic reality. Gulf oil has the highest profit margin in the history of commodity trading – higher than black markets and the drug trade. Oil states that spend $10 in capital and operating costs and sell the product at an average of $69 (the 2025 Brent average) would need to deploy capital many times larger than their oil capital to bridge the gap between industrial and service profit margins on the one hand and the oil profit margin on the other. Such investments are far from the present reality. The Vision gets around this disparity between oil and non-oil profitability through two models: 1) a bubble of public and private debt, and 2) transferring oil revenues into non-oil sectors. These tools can only close the gap over very long decades.
Second, the Vision project has increased dependence on oil in order to recycle revenues into high-risk investments in the non-oil sector. Under King Abdullah, the state needed to sell oil at $70 to balance its annual budget without a deficit; by 2025 it needed to sell oil at more than $90 to balance the government budget (Asharq/Bloomberg). These results only appeared after the Vision – the vision of income diversification. In practice, the Vision now needs oil more than before: we need to sell it 30% above the market price, and $20 a barrel above the price under King Abdullah.
Third, free trade and the theory of the free market have in practice led to monopolies in various sectors: exports, energy production, monetary reserves, industrial production, rare minerals. None of these fields are open to fair competition; they are controlled by international monopolies. This is the obstacle facing late entrants seeking to diversify their sources of income: latecomer governments lack the advantage of patents and the ability to compete globally, because the other governments have not only taken control and monopolised, but have also paid off the cost of capital and enjoy the advantage of cutting prices and raising production. In industrial production, whoever produces first hampers the productive capacity of the late entrants, through barriers, market domination, having already paid capital costs, and the ability to dominate market shares in international exports. Let me give an example from the economic writer Fawaz al-Fawaz, in a letter to the Saudi communications minister: “Your Excellency, I will not argue numbers with you. But I have a few related questions: 1) Where are the patents after the investments you mentioned – do you know that advanced electronics began with China’s Huawei? 2) Where are the globally competitive products, and how do our experiences compare with Korea’s SK Hynix? 3) Do the listed companies offer their own technology, or merely adapt well-known services? 4) Where exactly is our role in artificial intelligence on the value ladder, in terms of technologies, models and applications? 5) To a stage where the market is monopolised by Cisco and two Indian companies?” No one responded to these critical and objective questions.
Fourth, Saudi Arabia and most Gulf governments have a huge backlog of stalled projects. The financial centre in Riyadh is one example, the metro project took more than ten years, and many major projects are faltering. This did not begin after the economic Vision was announced: the project of phantom industrial cities led by al-Sabbagh under King Abdullah is another example. Weak delivery, financing and implementation in the construction sector pushed major companies out of the sector and shrank their market value, as with the Binladin Group and Saudi Oger, after disasters, crises, neglect of safety standards and other causes. In 2016 the newspaper Argaam reported: “The Riyadh Region Projects Monitoring Programme at the High Commission for the Development of Riyadh revealed that the number of delayed and stalled projects in the Riyadh region reached 671, at a cost of around 57.4 billion riyals.” In 2014, before the Vision, former finance minister al-Assaf spoke of a 13% rate of stalled projects; in 2017, under the Vision, the rate reached 22.5% (Al-Watan, July 2018). Today the economic debate is whether projects are stalled or merely delayed, as the finance minister puts it – or whether stalling is a historic structural crisis of mega-projects. How did the rate of delayed or stalled projects rise after the promises to the Americans to invest a trillion dollars over five years? Is it not a paradox that the time between postponing the NEOM projects and the promises to invest in the United States is only a few months?
Fifth, a model of non-oil development built on loans and debt turns, dialectically and interactively, into an economic burden. Saudi Arabia’s accumulated deficit has exceeded 2 trillion riyals; the kingdom has paid off part of the deficit while the rest became public debt, in order to control the level of debt relative to GDP. Saudi Arabia now spends 60 billion riyals a year to reduce total debt, and 30 to 60 billion riyals a year on debt servicing (interest and instalments). Reliance on debt has gone beyond public debt and threatened liquidity in the banking sector in 2024–2025. In parallel, state-affiliated institutions now borrow and book their debts to their own entities rather than to the public debt. The debts of ten Saudi companies exceed Egypt’s external debt. The burden of stalled projects is the worst road to income diversification. Public debt has become an economic obstacle to the policy of diversifying sources of income.
Sixth, the failure to attract foreign investment is part of the global faltering of foreign investment flows since the COVID crisis. Foreign investment has not recovered to its 2015 levels worldwide: global foreign investment flows lost a third of their value between 2015 and 2025, and in Saudi Arabia net inflows of foreign investment fell from 2.89% of GDP in 2021 to 1.72% in 2024 (a 40% decline). When I studied foreign investment I found several important points. First, foreign investment in the Gulf has lost the levels of profitability and growth it achieved during the last boom at the beginning of the millennium (2004–2012); today the Saudi economy is growing at half the rate of the second boom, so it is not considered an attractive environment for investment. Second, two-thirds of outgoing global foreign investment heads west, towards the advanced industrial economies. The economist Michael Roberts notes this regarding China: “China’s outgoing trade and financial flows go north, to the Western countries.” In effect, the advanced countries sell the idea of foreign investment to the countries of the South, while in practice capital flows towards them. By the same simple logic we can apply this to the investment pledges in the United States worth a trillion dollars: this is equivalent to 23 years of domestic national government capital spending, and the pledges refer to Trump’s presidential term (over five years). Third, organic dependence on investment flows from abroad lays the foundations for financial fragility, which may transmit global economic crises into the local economy. If foreign investment is tied to local investment, it is tied to the international economy – but at the same time this tie is competitive over profits and crowded over losses. One example of a crisis of investment flows is the Asian Tigers’ crisis of the 1990s: a successful and effective moment before the economic crisis and the flight of foreign investment. (Another example: Dubai.)
Note: foreign direct investment is not an accurate measure of the volume of incoming investment, because it is calculated only for significant stakes above 10% of ownership; investments that do not meet this condition count as FPI (foreign portfolio investment).
Finally, the slogan of income diversification is a popular marketing trick in the capitalist world, in which governments try to reap quick profits from high-risk investments; through support for privatisation, the lifting of subsidies on goods and higher taxes on the poor, economic policy at home has followed the path of neoliberalism. This is nothing strange to local affairs: al-Ghadhami published a critical book on neoliberalism. Economic (neo)liberalism has achieved no notable success even in its Western cradle, which today suffers from eroding profits, crises of public spending, rising unemployment and low growth.
In the first reading of the sovereign fund’s results, the annual rate of return was close to that of bonds (2.6%) – unable to withstand inflation. Then Aramco was offered for public subscription and lost its sovereignty, becoming a tool for financing the Public Investment Fund through an annual deduction from its revenues, transferring money from oil revenues into local and global investment stakes – all under the cover of income diversification. Every country wants this coveted diversification of its income sources, but turning taxes and government fees into non-oil revenue is a way of getting around the essence of real income diversification. This diversification, which has become a general goal in every country, is a cherished wish of the capitalist soul but far removed from reality. If every economy is to achieve modern industrial development, who will buy the exports? And if the Gulf states are going to invest in artificial intelligence and electric cars, what will Western and Chinese technology companies do? No wonder the sovereign fund’s investment in Lucid fell from $529 to $6 between 2021 and 2026 (and lower now). This is one example of the mistakes through which the government has lost sovereign wealth, among many other local and global examples. Because of its high-risk investment tendency, SABIC went from peak profits before the Vision of up to 25 billion riyals to losses due to high-risk investments and poor management – and strangely, the losses reached the same level as the profits, only in reverse: losses of 25 billion riyals.
After Aramco lost its sovereignty through the IPO, the Jafurah field lost its sovereignty through joint financing and leasing with BlackRock.
Many imported products cost less than producing them locally, and industry is a sector that repels investment at home and needs constant government support. That is why the biggest winner of the Vision is the banks, which have seen a bubble of debt and lending reach historic levels, while the other sectors perform modestly. The industrial sector is still waiting for government support and threatening to close down, as came up when the industry minister (al-Khorayef) spoke to factory owners at the last conference. If the industrial sector repels investment flows and needs support, how are we going to reach diversification of income sources?
Gulf productive capacities in industry and elsewhere have tried to attract foreign industries to assemble locally, or have resorted, Gulf-wide, to traditional industries copied with global and external capacities, as with the products of Jebel Ali. These patterns take an illusory form of income diversification: attracting global companies to produce locally is not local industry; nor is re-exporting global products that move along logistics supply chains – which is extremely important, but entirely different from local exports.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf governments turned to attracting foreign industries in the name of income diversification, but there is growing and varied opacity about the scale of the losses of the Saudi Public Investment Fund across its 90 companies.
The Vision tried to offer a model of domesticating all services, ideas and cultural and entertainment products into profit-making capitalist products. But Shahid flooded its products through monopoly and a lower rate of profit in order to win market share. This led to the experiment of Turki Al-Sheikh: a Shura Council report stated that “on 14 July 2025, the General Entertainment Authority spent around 1.67 billion Saudi riyals in a single year, with revenues of no more than 7 million Saudi riyals.” A profit ratio of less than 0.5% – not even reaching a 1% margin – is a ratio no one interested in income diversification can take seriously. The Vision failed to make profitable gains from entertainment, and this is a deep crisis in the structure of the arts, from theatre to all kinds of cultural and intellectual products, since entertainment is considered among their highest earners in present reality.
The real problem is that every current of capitalism has failed, as Chris Harman observed in his well-known book published in Arabic as The Crazy Economy – which became an academic research thesis entitled “The Crisis of Bourgeois Economics” – where he explains that globalised openness and economic liberalism have gone bankrupt in producing solutions to save themselves, as have the schools of conservative economics (Keynesianism and the welfare state). Capitalism has tried every available option, and with each option it failed – in every one of its models and in every one of its schools. The Vision comes as a rehash of the modern liberal schools that were embroiled in the 2008 and 2002 crises. The problem of Saudi capitalism is therefore part of an international problem of market policy and of governments turning into profit-making entities at the expense of public spending, growing monopolisation of wealth, an accelerating pace of exploitation, the privatisation of pension funds and a terrifying class inequality across the Mashreq and the Maghreb. These conditions require a radical change that is missing from the Vision – not merely the application of the advice of transnational consultancy firms that commodify commercial illusions and have misleading track records. The solution lies in shifting production from the priority of profit to meeting human needs; from the market’s control over human beings to human beings’ control over their products; from the economy of an elite minority to the economy of the majority. If military spending is higher than spending on housing and education, and if taxes go to fund the ruling class, then this is a capitalism that puts profits before lives – and this problem can only be overcome through workers’ and revolutionary confrontation to change the crisis-ridden mode of production and to confront the monopoly and political tyranny prevailing in our society and in our societies across different countries. This capitalist mode, steeped in exploitation, will not be solved by a modern liberal vision; the solution is in the hands of the masses and the workers, who must take control of politics and the economy from the ruling class by force, and establish a government that sets the right priorities – every other solution follows in the wake of the governments that created their own crises. International Trotskyist socialism is the solution! The solution for all of us!
An opinion piece by our comrades in Saudi Arabia.
