The Transitional Program of the Revolutionary Left in Syria

Introduction

Since mid-March 2011, our country has been witnessing a revolutionary process, in the context of the revolutions sweeping the Arab region, through which the Syrian popular revolution aims to rid itself of dictatorship, and to achieve freedom, dignity, equality, and social justice. On this path, it has endured immense suffering and great sacrifices due to the violence and killing unleashed by the dictatorship in its confrontation with the peaceful protests and struggles of the Syrian masses.

Despite the magnitude of these sacrifices and the brutality of dictatorial violence, the Syrian popular masses continue their peaceful revolution until the achievement of their stated goals and the overthrow of the regime of the ruling oligarchy.

While it is necessary to emphasize the importance that the Syrian revolutionary left attaches to the alliance of democratic and social forces in general in confronting dictatorship, in accordance with the requirements of the struggle at the current stage and from the standpoint of the general and historical interests of the Syrian masses in the context of the ongoing revolutionary dynamic, the revolutionary left in Syria affirms that it adopts the major goals of the Syrian popular revolution: freedom, democracy, dignity, and social justice, and remains committed to engaging in all mass struggles for these objectives. Considering that revolutionary dynamism is part of the process of building democracy from below, it does not hesitate, in the current transitional phase, to adopt the call for the establishment of a civil, democratic, and pluralistic state.

We also affirm intellectually our adoption of the call for the broadest forms of participatory democracy and direct democracy, so that the vast majority of people can directly manage their own lives. At the same time, the ongoing and interconnected Arab revolutions have demonstrated beyond doubt the fact that the democratic mass struggle is linked, from below, to the struggle for radical social transformation from below as well.

Challenges of the Revolutionary Process in Syria

One of the last gatherings in Syria was held under the slogan of opposition unity. It is clear that this issue has become a highly urgent concern for many in the Syrian arena, as if it were the only factor capable of accelerating the collapse of the regime and putting an end to the bloody and horrific massacres it commits daily against the rebellious people.

This is while the calls for such unity do not take into account the grave contradictions between the parties and components of this opposition, especially when we know that while revolutionary groups operating on the ground and leading the movement to one degree or another continue to emphasize their commitment to the three well-known principles (the peaceful nature of the revolution, absolute rejection of foreign military intervention, and insistence on the overthrow of the regime and non-dialogue with it), we observe that a part of the opponents of the Assad family’s authority inside the country are inclined toward dialogue with it, while another part—especially the opposition residing abroad, and this is the most dangerous—are supporters of the militarization of the current popular uprising, in order to secure a foothold inside the country.

The effects of their position have begun to reach the interior, with the emergence of voices in local coordination committees that initially began raising the demand for international protection, later shifting to the demand for the imposition of a no-fly zone!! That is precisely the same thing which, in Libya, led to direct NATO intervention, with consequences that are certainly more than disastrous. This calls for a complete reconsideration of the slogan of unity, especially after it has become clear that the three principles mentioned above are being violated, and may soon become a thing of the past in the coming weeks and months—particularly due to anger over the regime’s brutality and its unprecedented forms of repression in Syria’s history.

At the same time, there is a need to expose the advocates of militarization—who are feeding into the mill of a regime that is now desperate to push matters toward this abyss, particularly toward what will most likely accompany it: sectarian civil strife, which it seeks to ignite through various means, especially through its abhorrent sectarian incitement. There is also a need, above all, to warn against the dangers of foreign intervention in the revolution, and to prepare the radical opposition itself to practically confront any subsequent military role on Syrian soil by NATO, or by any reactionary Arab or Middle Eastern powers (Israel, Turkey, etc.). This, of course, without abandoning the decisive position, at the same time, against the Baathist dictatorship.

Building the Revolutionary Left and the Transitional Tasks

In any case, one of the reasons for this confusion regarding the leadership of the revolutionary movement, which has been ongoing for more than six months in Syria, is the absence of an organized and active revolutionary left there. This is the result of the historical, abhorrent alignment of the traditional communist movement with the existing regime on the one hand, and the regime’s ability, through brutal repression on the other hand, since the 1980s, to crush the revolutionary left, and indeed all forces of political opposition.

This situation places at the top of the agenda of revolutionaries in the Syrian arena the task of producing an organized revolutionary Marxist left, through engagement on the ground in the ongoing process of struggle, and at the same time through rallying around the current and immediate transitional tasks that form an integral part of a transitional program for the historical period inaugurated by the ongoing revolutionary process.

We will present below the essential elements of this program, noting that it may later be enriched with additional elements according to the development of this process. It can already be estimated that the success of the Syrian masses in overthrowing a regime that has existed for more than four decades and is armed with all means of repression and coercion will not happen overnight. The struggle of these masses may therefore be prolonged, in order to achieve the aforementioned goal, which may allow sufficient time—in the context of a revolutionary process not limited to Syria but also extending to other Arab countries and potentially encompassing the entire Arab world—for the building of an effective revolutionary left capable of mobilizing the toilers, the oppressed, and all those aspiring to freedom, dignity, and social justice, on the basis of the advanced program it raises in confrontation with the programs of other political and social forces.

Hence, the current and immediate transitional tasks are as follows:

1. The overthrow of the regime and the establishment of an interim revolutionary government to:
   • Dismantling the security structure of the state
   • Call for the election of a Constituent Assembly, on the basis of proportional representation, which shall draft a constitution for a civil, democratic, and pluralistic state, provided that this constitution guarantees public freedoms and human rights, and achieves full equality among citizens regardless of their religious, intellectual, national, ethnic, or gender affiliation, etc. At the same time, it emphasizes the paramount importance of linking political and social democracy, and the commitment to a fundamental effort to accomplish national and pan-Arab tasks, whether related to the liberation of the occupied Golan Heights or those related to the effective support of the Palestinian people’s struggle to exercise their right of return and self-determination over their entire historic land.
2. Building the revolutionary left in Syria, through unifying its members and groups, working to transform it into an effective political and social force, and bringing together its components around a transitional program capable of mobilizing a broad mass base around it, thereby opening the way for the maturation of the current political democratic revolution into a comprehensive socio-national revolution within a relatively short period, in close alliance with the forces of the revolutionary process across the Arab region.

The basic elements of this programme will fall under four broad headings, the first of which relates to democratic freedoms and the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

First: Democratic Freedoms and the Independence of the Judiciary

Since the Baath Party came to power in 1963, public freedoms of all kinds have been dealt a severe blow, especially through the absolute monopolistic domination of the aforementioned party over state and society, now embodied in Article 8 of the Constitution. This trajectory continued and became more violent with Hafez al-Assad’s coup in autumn 1970, which consolidated, alongside party totalitarianism, the family rule of the Assad dynasty.

Of course, it is not only Article 8 that must be abolished, but the entire current Syrian Constitution must be replaced, with the need to draft a new constitution establishing genuine political democracy as well as social democracy, and guaranteeing all known freedoms, in particular freedom of opinion and expression, belief, assembly, demonstration, strike, formation of parties, associations, professional unions, and freedom of movement, etc. This constitution shall be drafted by a Constituent Assembly elected in a fair manner on the basis of proportional representation, by all citizens, including soldiers, without any discrimination among voters.

In the context of this process, the tasks of this program include:

1. Dissolution of all unions affiliated with the ruling party, including the General Federation of Trade Unions, the General Union of Peasants, the General Union of Syrian Students, and all other unions, and opening the way for the establishment of independent unions across all sectors and professions, based on free membership and fully democratic functioning, free from any prior domination
   
2. This must be accompanied by the dissolution of all existing security apparatuses, holding accountable those responsible for crimes against humanity, and rebuilding the necessary institutions to protect citizens and society, rather than repress, humiliate, and oppress them, as is currently the case
   
3. Reorganization of the army on democratic foundations to ensure the security of the homeland and protection of its borders, as well as its participation, when necessary, in protecting the national security of Arab peoples and in their struggles for liberation, especially the effective contribution to the liberation of the Palestinian people

Finally, in this regard, it is necessary to emphasize the full independence of the judiciary, ensuring all mechanisms and conditions that make it an impartial and incorruptible judiciary applying laws honestly and justly, in a true rule-of-law state where people are not arrested without cause and are not subjected to torture, humiliation, or killing inside or outside prisons.

On this basis, one of the most important components of a transitional program in a revolutionary phase is the release of all political prisoners, the prosecution of their jailers, and the provision of material and moral compensation to them, as well as the prosecution of all those responsible for crimes against the Syrian people, especially crimes against humanity.

Second: Separation of religion and state, within the framework of freedom of belief, and guaranteeing the rights of national minorities

Religion is a personal and social matter that must not have any relation to the state. The state must guarantee full freedom of belief and expression and the right to religious practice, and ensure the secularization of state and society, with full separation between religion and state, so that legislation in all matters, including personal status issues, is civil in nature, and citizens are able to hold any position in the state or administration on the basis of full equality, without any religious, sectarian, national, or other discrimination.

At the level of national minorities, our position is clear regarding the preservation of the unity of the homeland and the unity of the common struggle of the rebellious masses. However, in addition to this intellectual conviction, we call for guaranteeing all political, social, economic, and cultural rights of the national minorities present in Syria, especially the Kurdish, Assyrian, Armenian, and Circassian minorities

Third: Socio-Economic Status and Women’s Emancipation

The Baath Party came to power in Syria in 1963, following the radical steps taken in Egypt in response to secession, particularly in the field of property relations, where extensive nationalizations were implemented as part of strengthening the so-called “socialist” orientation of Nasserism. This influenced the policy of the new Syrian authorities, which also insisted on combining “freedom and unity” with the project of “socialist construction.”

To this end, projects returned to their original owners by the secessionist government were renationalized, and the ceiling on agricultural ownership was reduced, thereby deepening agrarian reform initiated during the union between Syria and Egypt. This continued even under the so-called Corrective Movement of Hafez al-Assad, and most recently in 1980. The public sector was also expanded during the first decade of Assad’s rule through the construction of numerous state factories, although this was accompanied by unprecedented corruption and severe mismanagement, which affected production quality and output levels, as is generally the case in most components of the Syrian public sector, benefiting a corrupt bureaucracy encouraged by the head of state to follow this path.

This trend continued until 1991, when Law No. 10, the so-called Investment Promotion Law, was issued, allowing the capital accumulated by this bureaucracy through plundering state property and, by extension, the Syrian people, to be invested in private projects, alongside foreign capital. This led to the clear expansion of the private sector at the expense of the public sector.

This culminated in 2010, during the tenth Baath Party Conference, with the abandonment of previous rhetoric about the “socialist economy” in favor of the explicit adoption of the so-called “social market economy.” This law accelerated the regime’s tendency to further weaken state-owned factories and public production projects, rendering them loss-making and paving the way for their sale to the private sector or for private participation in ownership and management. This followed the end of public sector monopolies in many areas of production under Law No. 10 mentioned above. This was later accompanied—especially after Bashar al-Assad came to power—by the state’s withdrawal from foreign trade monopoly and the emergence of private banks, including branches of foreign banks.

This policy also extended to agriculture through the 2009 law, which significantly raised the ceiling on agricultural ownership in order to facilitate the laundering of money accumulated through the plundering of the Syrian state and society, by purchasing large landholdings from impoverished small farmers or from the state. This has resulted in increased poverty and misery for millions, forcing migration—temporary or permanent—to the outskirts of Damascus and other major cities in search of work. These populations face sharp increases in the cost of living, worsened after the state ended subsidies, as well as unemployment officially estimated at 19%, while in reality much higher (some estimate at least 30%), among the worst in the world, particularly among youth, who are therefore participating in the revolution we are witnessing.

This situation disproportionately affects Syrian women due to the lack of real equality in the labor market, in addition to the burden of the double working day (when they do find employment), meaning they work both inside and outside the home simultaneously.

1. Adoption of a sliding wage scale, with the minimum wage raised to 25,000 Syrian pounds per month
2. Complete cessation of privatization, restoration of state ownership of previously privatized enterprises without compensation, and nationalization of newly emerging enterprises either because they result from the ruling family’s rent-sharing practices (such as Syriatel owned by Rami Makhlouf, the president’s cousin), or because they are key strategic industrial sectors or owned by parasitic bourgeois groups
3. A comprehensive restructuring of the public sector through expanded state investment and strict oversight involving workers and employees, with accountability for all managerial failures. Worker control in factories and private enterprises shall also be implemented through democratically elected committees
4. Restoration of state control over foreign trade and nationalization of banks
5. Confiscation of funds proven to have been obtained through plunder of public assets, and judicial prosecution of those responsible
6. Progressive taxation, particularly on capital gains, stock market operations, and all forms of speculation .including real estate, alongside exemption of incomes below the minimum wage
7. Guaranteed employment for all working-age citizens, men and women.
8. Provision of adequate state subsidies for essential goods.
9. Control of prices by independent trade unions and consumer associations.
10. Revision of agrarian reform laws and their amendments, especially the 2010 amendment, to reduce agricultural property ceilings by at least 30% below the 1980 levels.
11. Complete cessation of state land sales and transformation of such lands into model collective farms managed by workers’ associations, supervising production and distribution of income, with beneficiaries divided into three categories: workers (at least 70% of income, with wage differentials not exceeding 1:3), reinvestment for development and modernization, and the state as landowner (not exceeding 10% of income). One of the objectives is to encourage small and medium farmers to adopt collective farming
12. State support for small farmers through extension services, low-interest loans, and guaranteed purchase schemes when necessary
13. Active promotion of agricultural cooperatives
14. Support for the establishment of small farmer committees, which—together with workers’ and banking committees—monitor transport, credit, and trade operations in agriculture, with strong state support.
15. Provision of medicine at cost price through state production policies, and ensuring semi-free healthcare in well-equipped public hospitals.
16. Establishment of kindergartens, public restaurants with full sanitary conditions, and public laundries to free women as much as possible from domestic labor, alongside full equality between men and women in all fields, including wages for equal qualifications.
17. Provision of near-free education for all school-age children up to university and higher vocational education, on democratic bases, allowing students’ associations to participate meaningfully in decision-making concerning their academic life.

Fourth: National and National Issues

One of the major weaknesses, so far, in the Arab revolutions is the evident neglect of national and pan-Arab questions. In Syria, this is particularly evident because the regime being challenged insists on false claims regarding its role as “resistance” and “resistance axis,” portraying the popular movement against it as part of a Western conspiracy. Therefore, the function of a revolutionary left in such conditions is to engage the masses while advancing a clear program at both national and pan-Arab levels

1. At the national level

The task of the revolutionary left in Syria at this level is to pressure and mobilize for the adoption of advanced positions against the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, and to call on the army to move from the streets and neighborhoods—where it carries out repression and killings of its own people in defense of a corrupt and oppressive regime—to the front against the Zionist occupying enemy, in preparation for an integrated plan to force its unconditional withdrawal from the Golan, as happened in Lebanon in 2000, through all possible means, including meeting the conditions for popular war in which other Arab peoples may participate according to their capacities.

The demand for the liberation of the Golan is a central component of the Syrian revolutionary left’s program, and thus of the Syrian revolution itself. It is a decisive lever for exposing the regime’s propaganda about “resistance,” and for undermining its remaining popular support and the cohesion of its security apparatus and army, which are immersed in the blood of a fundamental section of the Syrian people, whose ranks are expected to grow continuously.

• At the national level

Fortunately, the Syrian revolution—despite all massacres and acts of extermination committed against the people—takes place within a broader Arab revolutionary process that is transforming equations day by day, leading to continuous shifts in the balance of power against hostile forces, whether global, regional, or local.

On this basis, the highest priority of the revolutionary left in Syria is the recovery of programmatic tasks historically raised by the communist and nationalist movements in the Arab region, now enriched by new developments in light of the Arab revolutionary spring. These include:

1. Solidarity with all Arab revolutions and ensuring the conditions for their continuity, development, and maturation into social revolutions, with exchange of all forms of support, especially with the most advanced revolution, the Egyptian revolution.
2. Full solidarity with the Palestinian people and their struggle to restore their full rights in their homeland, including the right of return and self-determination, and the rejection of all US-Israeli settlement projects, while pressuring Arab states to sever relations with Israel and mobilizing their masses toward this goal.
3. Reaffirmation of the slogan of Arab unity and its reintroduction to the political agenda across the region, linked to the struggle against imperialist domination over the wealth of our peoples—especially energy resources. Arab unity must be based on the free will of the peoples and on federal relations respecting regional particularities, while recognizing the rights of non-Arab national minorities, especially Kurds and Amazigh
4. Some forces participating in the revolutionary movement in several Arab countries, including Syria, seek to avoid confrontation with global imperialism, and some even hope to benefit from its support against Arab dictatorships, especially in Damascus. However, these revolutions, including the Syrian revolution, will only succeed to the extent that they engage in a direct and open confrontation with these hostile forces, mobilizing all popular energies in this struggle, and advancing toward the fullest realization of freedom, unity, and social justice, in its highest expression: the construction of socialism.
5. Finally, no revolutionary transitional program in Syria can ignore the question of power. One of its central elements is the establishment of a revolutionary government representing workers and poor peasants, as well as other toiling social strata, including small producers, employees, soldiers, intellectual workers, and the marginalized and unemployed, men and women alike

In the great dialogue taking place today across a vast area exceeding thirteen million square kilometers, involving a vast segment of people through modern means of communication, many express optimism about the coming victory of the Arab revolutions, including the Syrian revolution.

We, for our part, will remain optimistic to the extent that a Syrian revolutionary left—still in its formative stage—succeeds in standing firmly on its own feet in the coming months. This will depend on the extent to which a significant segment of popular militants, currently engaged in a promising process, rallies around the program outlined above, from Daraa in the far south to Hasakah and Qamishli in the north, to Al-Bukamal and Deir ez-Zor in the northeast, passing through Idlib and Latakia in the west, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and of course the capital Damascus!!!

October 1, 2011

After discussions, we, a group of Syrian revolutionary leftists, agreed on the transitional program of the revolutionary left in Syria published above, as a commitment to the revolution on the one hand, and as a contribution to rebuilding the revolutionary left around it on the other.

We believe that this program expresses the most important common denominators of the Syrian militant left. Therefore, we call on all revolutionary left activists and groups in Syria to actively contribute to its development and construction.

Let’s walk this path together