The Syrian Thermidor

Introduction

On December 8, 2024, the Assad clan’s reign was announced to have collapsed following a  rapid military operation that lasted no more than 11 days. These days haven´t witnessed real large military battles. Before the arrival of the advancing Islamist armed factions from the city of Idlib in northwestern Syria toward the capital Damascus, the regime’s army and all its security and intelligence institutions had already disintegrated on their own.

At the forefront of these factions was Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which seized control of Damascus. It is the most disciplined and experienced of the Islamist factions, with other Salafist groups among its ranks, alongside jihadist groups linked to Turkey and units of fighters from what is called the “National Army.” The military operation resembled more a process of filling the vacuum left by the total collapse of the Assad junta than the destruction of a still-functioning system.

From the very first days of entering Damascus, the new authorities declared the fall of the old regime — a declaration which, in reality, meant the end of the revolution and that it was now “time to build the state.”

Across Syria, massive crowds poured into the streets celebrating the downfall of the family-based dictatorship — both father and son — a brutal and tyrannical regime that had brought unprecedented massacres, killings, destruction, and devastation to the Syrian people for over five decades.

Many people, caught up in the moment, declared that the events represented the revolution’s victory, and that the new authority was the revolutionary force that had carried the torch since the popular uprising began in 2011.

Concurrent with this wave of flattery and allegiance to the new authority among segments of the public — including liberals, left-liberals, and intellectuals — the new rulers revealed themselves within their first week by declaring the “end of the revolution” and announcing the establishment of a “free market economy” in Syria, integrating the country into the global capitalist system. This was in place of adopting revolutionary economic policies.

The economic system that collapsed with the Assad regime had been one in which the ruling junta monopolized the dominant role in national capitalism and controlled the country’s wealth.

From the outset, two central ideas shaped the new authority’s program:

1. Integration into the global capitalist system and a free market economy.
2. Declaring the revolution over.

We have observed similar policies in other countries after regime changes — policies that have either suppressed or defeated popular uprisings — from Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union’s collapse to revolutions and uprisings in Latin America, Iran, Laos, and Cambodia.

From the outset, two central ideas shaped the new authority’s program: Integration into the global capitalist system and a free market economy, and declaring the revolution over.

Citat: Revolutionary Left Current in Syria

In every case, though each country’s conditions and outcomes differed, the process followed a recognizable pattern: the retreat or defeat of revolutionary forces, the rise of leadership from the petty and middle bourgeoisie, and the establishment of various forms of capitalist statehood.

Even the neoliberal transformations that swept much of the world since the 1980s, often born from such aborted revolutions, did not necessarily lead to new revolutionary states. Instead, they often arose on the ruins of popular movements, cutting ties with the original revolutionary dynamics and narratives despite asserting themselves as the revolution itself.

In many cases, these new authorities imposed neoliberal policies on their people after the fall of dictatorships, opening their economies to the global market — what we describe as a Thermidorian turn.The collapse of dictatorships, therefore, does not necessarily mark the onset of a democratic transition, as some Western research centers like to promote. In such processes, true democracy exists only to the extent that revolutionary political and social forces — especially the working class and the toiling masses — lead them.

From the Outbreak of the Popular Revolution to its Defeat

The Syrian popular revolution erupted in mid-March 2011 as a mass political and social protest against the Assad family’s ruling junta, which had long oppressed the Syrian people and pushed the country’s poor into ever deeper misery.

For a comprehensive overview of the revolution’s essence, its trajectory, and our earlier analyses of it — from the time it was still unfolding in 2011 up to the present — readers can refer to the Revolutionary Left Current’s website. 

The revolution’s defeat was due to several factors:
The extreme brutality of the old regime.
The absence of an experienced revolutionary leadership.
The intervention and competition of regional and imperialist powers.

The revolutionary movement’s demand for freedom, equality, justice, and dignity being met with overwhelming violence.
By 2012–2013, the Syrian scene had shifted into a new phase. Under the banner of the so-called “Free Syrian Army” (FSA), locally based armed factions gained prominence. However, their armament was limited, and they faced increasing militarization from Salafist-jihadist factions with better weapons and funding.

The trajectory of the revolution changed, shifting from armed resistance against Assad’s regime to intense competition among armed opposition factions for resources and control.

The first victims of this intra-opposition armed conflict were FSA factions composed of defected soldiers and officers from Assad’s army, alongside civilians who had taken up arms to defend themselves and their communities. Many of these groups were crushed by better-equipped jihadist forces.

The trajectory of the revolution changed, shifting from armed resistance against Assad’s regime to intense competition among armed opposition factions for resources and control

Citat: Revolutionary Left Current in Syria

This was followed by a series of internal purges, during which jihadist factions eliminated FSA units. As the popular uprising receded, the jihadists imposed their domination over most areas outside Assad’s control, alongside the rise of ISIS (Daesh) and other hardline Salafist groups.

In the latter half of 2013 and into 2014, the most extreme form of counter-revolution emerged in the fascistic ISIS. This organization destroyed what remained of the popular revolution — both its civilian and military aspects — while expanding its control over vast territories in Syria and Iraq.

ISIS reached the Kurdish city of Kobani/Ayn al-Arab in September 2014, where it faced fierce resistance from the Kurdish fighters — marking the group’s first major defeat and the start of its decline.

The battle for Kobani became the pretext for direct U.S. military intervention in Syria under the banner of an international coalition to fight ISIS. This also provided imperialist states with a justification to intervene militarily in our country under the guise of “combating terrorism.”

Russia later announced its own direct military intervention in Syria in support of the Assad regime, while Turkey also entered militarily on August 24, 2016, under the pretext of fighting “terrorism” — meaning primarily the Kurdish movement in Syria — eventually leading to further Turkish occupation of Syrian territory in 2018 and 2019.

In response, Iran intervened early on through allied militias to support the Assad regime. Meanwhile, Israel persisted in its strategy of weakening Syria’s political, economic, and military capabilities with the objective of maintaining a compliant guardian of its borders, whether it be the Assad regime or any other entity. As a result, Syria became an open arena for direct conflict between competing imperialist and regional powers.

Imperialist Rivalries

Several imperialist powers have competed over Syria, seeking to organize their clashes and prevent direct confrontation. This has resulted in certain understandings, most notably between the United States and Russia, regarding the military presence in northeastern Syria.

Russian-backed areas remained under the control of the Assad regime, along with Iranian forces and militias, while western Syria stayed under Turkish influence. Additionally, an implicit agreement between Russia and Israel enabled Israel to launch strikes on Iranian and Hezbollah positions within Syrian territory.

The most publicized coordination between these powers came in May 2017 at the Astana meeting, where Russia, Turkey, and Iran signed “de-escalation” agreements. These effectively divided Syria into zones of influence, managed by their respective proxies and local administrations.

One result of the Astana agreements was the forced displacement of thousands of opposition fighters and their families from southern Damascus, rural Damascus, southern Syria, and central Syria to Idlib and its countryside. These regions have since become militarily, politically, and economically tied to Turkey.

Despite occasional infighting among the Islamist armed factions in northern Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) maintained control over Idlib and remained under Turkish influence while holding power locally.

Since 2019, the division of control among imperialist powers has solidified. In northeastern Syria, the Autonomous Administration governed areas with its own institutions, while in Turkish-occupied areas, the so-called Syrian Interim Government operated under Ankara’s direction.

In Idlib, HTS’s “Salvation Government” controlled approximately 60% of the province. The rest of Syria’s territory was under the Assad regime’s control.

Despite occasional infighting among the Islamist armed factions in northern Syria, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) maintained control over Idlib and remained under Turkish influence while holding power locally.

Citat: Revolutionary Left Current in Syria

Across all these zones, the local populations lived under political and economic conditions distinct from those elsewhere in Syria. The Interim Government was essentially a puppet regime, entirely dependent on Turkey, which directly managed its territories.

The Autonomous Administration had more independence in decision-making and maintained a non-sectarian, democratic political program — at least compared to the Assad regime and HTS — though it remained economically tied to other Syrian regions and to Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

HTS, for its part, implemented an economy based on neoliberal policies, controlling border crossings for revenue and monopolizing sectors such as fuel. It also engaged in trade with Turkey and other factions — even amid the wars between them.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime’s economy was in steep decline, worsened by international sanctions, widespread corruption, and the unlimited looting of the ruling elite.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

HTS governs Idlib province — a large area in northern Syria — up to the point it took power in Damascus. Idlib is home to approximately 4.5 million people, most of them displaced from other parts of Syria that fell under Assad’s control. This includes roughly 2.9 million displaced persons, with about 2 million living in miserable conditions in tents near the Turkish border.

The ongoing war and HTS’s neoliberal economic policies, combined with the devastating earthquake of February 2023, left more than 90% of Idlib’s population dependent on international aid.

The humanitarian situation worsened further when aid levels shrank. As noted by the UN Deputy Regional Coordinator for Syria in a February 28, 2024 statement to DW German media, the UN had been able to provide only 37% of Syria’s humanitarian needs at the start of 2023. The severe funding shortage has led the World Food Programme to stop distributing food aid across Syria from January 2024, adding to inflation, soaring unemployment, and deepening poverty for the majority of Syrians.

Social Base

HTS’s leadership comes largely from the petty bourgeoisie: educated clerics, small merchants, and professionals. Its rank-and-file fighters are drawn mainly from displaced persons living in camps, the unemployed, artisans, and small traders — alongside foreign jihadists and members of the “lumpen proletariat.”

The worsening conditions of the Syrian masses are not simply due to weak humanitarian aid; they are the result of the policies of all ruling authorities — starting with Assad’s regime — which prioritize the interests of their warlord elites over the needs of the people.

HTS’s repressive policies have sparked widespread protests in its territories, especially in March and April 2024, against worsening poverty and economic hardship. Demonstrators raised slogans such as “Neither Assad nor Jolani — we want to rebuild the country.”

Some developments in the region — such as imperialist agreements and shifts in the balance of power — may have helped HTS maintain its hold on Idlib, saving it from a collapse similar to that of Assad’s regime.

The Crisis of the Assad Regime

Over the past fourteen years since the revolution’s outbreak and its eventual defeat, Syria and its people have endured deep societal transformations. These have been shaped by the counter-revolutionary forces — including imperialist interventions — and by the devastating destruction of towns, villages, and Syria’s social fabric.

The destruction in Aleppo alone was greater than any other Syrian city, with more than 3,000 factories and workshops destroyed, along with tens of thousands of homes and infrastructure. The human toll — in deaths and injuries — was staggering.
Nearly half of Syria’s 23 million pre-war population was displaced, either internally or abroad, with the living standards of the majority collapsing to catastrophic levels. For many, survival itself became the primary concern.

For the ruling junta, the main objective was to extract whatever remaining resources were left in Syria. Even as ordinary Syrians faced starvation, the regime sought to drain them further — as in the case of Rami Makhlouf, a regime insider whose vast assets were seized by Assad himself.

By 2024, the Assad regime had become so weakened that even its own social base — the commercial bourgeoisie and what remained of industrial capitalists — recognized that the shrinking domestic market and declining purchasing power among Syrians posed a threat to the regime’s survival.

Some segments of the population which had once believed Assad was defending them from “sectarian monsters” discovered that, while they were starving, the ruling elite was living in luxury and sending its sons to die in war for its own survival.

Economic Collapse

A World Bank press release on May 24, 2024, reported that Syria’s agricultural sector had been severely affected by the war, with massive displacement among farmers and serious damage to irrigation networks and other infrastructure, leading to a drop in crop production. Trade was also heavily disrupted, causing a collapse in both industrial and agricultural output and increasing Syria’s dependence on imports.

On January 30, 2024, the United Nations stated that it would take 55 years for the Syrian economy to return to its 2010 level, given the extensive deterioration caused by the war and sanctions.

According to a report by the Jusoor Center for Studies on October 28, 2024, noted that the regime had become dependent on oil supplies from the Autonomous Administration areas — between 50,000 and 70,000 barrels per day — covering only 25–35% of its needs. On the industrial side, operations had declined sharply since 2011 due to war damage, lack of security, and loss of investment, leaving most industrialists unable to operate.

Between 2014 and 2017, industrial production dropped from about 25% of GDP to less than 8%, compared to its level in 2010. The trade sector also suffered from sanctions, the Lebanese financial crisis, and declining exports and imports, leaving it largely dependent on limited domestic commerce.

To make up for lost revenue, the regime increasingly turned to smuggling through internal and external border crossings, as well as to the growing drug trade, which brought in $5.7 billion by 2021.

By 2023, World Bank figures showed that poverty levels in Syria had reached 90% of the population. GDP had fallen from $61.3 billion in 2011 to $7.4 billion, while the Syrian pound had lost over 99.6% of its value. Foreign investment dropped by 500%, leaving the economy unable to meet the needs of 7.5 million children and 13 million displaced or refugee Syrians — despite continued aid from Assad’s allies.

All indicators pointed to a disintegration of Syria’s socio-economic structure under Assad, making the survival of his regime politically impossible. By 2024, the collapse had spread to the security and military institutions as well, with many officers and losing motivation to defend a regime that had starved and exploited them.

Disintegration of the Assad Regime

By late 2015, Russia — Assad’s main international ally — had become directly involved militarily in Syria, working to preserve the dying regime while also securing its own imperial interests.

In July 2016, Turkey — Assad’s former adversary — began establishing military contacts with various Islamist armed factions, aiming to shape a political settlement in Syria. This was followed by a series of communications between the Syrian and Turkish regimes, backed by Russia and Iran as guarantor states, which laid the groundwork for the Astana process.

This process effectively divided Syria into zones of control between the regime and the opposition, each under the protection or influence of one or more imperial powers — primarily Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States.

Despite intense Russian and Turkish efforts in 2022–2023 to reach further agreements — including calls for a summit between Erdogan and Assad — no real reconciliation took place. Assad, emboldened by the backing of Russia, Iran, and other allies, remained arrogant and intransigent, while Erdogan hesitated, seeking to maximize his own political advantage.

Concurrently, Russia’s extensive involvement in the Ukraine war since 2022 has constrained its capacity to prioritize Syria, leading to a shift in regional dynamics. Hezbollah and Iran suffered major blows from the Israeli occupation, particularly after the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation on October 7, 2023. The assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah by Israel on September 27, 2024 — just one day before Netanyahu’s public threat to Assad — further weakened Assad’s regional position.

Since 2023, Arab and European governments had attempted to establish diplomatic relations with Assad. However, it became apparent that there was no possibility of saving his regime, which was characterized by corruption and repression and was on its last legs. The Israeli occupation, meanwhile, saw Assad’s weakness as an opportunity:

To maintain the “calm” and security it had enjoyed along the Syrian border for over half a century. To expand its control over southern Syria in coordination with other imperialist powers.

To eliminate any remaining Syrian military capabilities that could pose a future threat.
By this point, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham had emerged as the only disciplined and experienced force capable of acting as a spearhead against the dying Assad regime, supported by a number of allied factions.

Announcement of Assad’s Fall

In this global, regional, and local context — with allied factions at its side — Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) declared the launch of the “Operation Deterrence of Aggression” on November 27, 2024, marking the beginning of Assad’s final collapse.

Within 24 hours, HTS’s “Deterrence of Aggression” forces had entered Aleppo — Syria’s second-largest city in the north — and within 11 days they had advanced to Damascus, capturing the remaining cities along the way.

On December 8, 2024, the new authorities officially announced the fall of the Assad regime — without encountering any significant resistance worth mentioning.

The regime’s soldiers abandoned their weapons and military uniforms, returned to their homes, and joined the street celebrations. In towns and cities, people flooded the streets, reclaiming spaces of freedom and public activity.

As for the Assad junta’s elite in the military, security, and political apparatus — they evaporated by the thousands, only for it to later be revealed that they had fled abroad to enjoy their wealth in exile.

The transition appeared to be a methodical “handover,” as opposed to the disorderly replacement of an authoritarian regime with another. This time, however, the strongest faction of the counter-revolution adopted the misleading guise of the revolution: HTS participated in the defeat of the revolution and appropriated its narrative for its own purposes.

HTS: Monopoly of Power / Massacres / Terror

Following the dissolution of the former regime, Syrian communities reclaimed their autonomy. People engaged in various forms of political, social, and cultural activities, including the formation of parties, associations, and alliances; the organization of conferences, seminars, demonstrations, and sit-ins; and the initiation of new efforts to rebuild society.

However, this brief “joy” and the reclaimed freedoms were quickly eroded. Fear replaced hope, as HTS and its armed factions committed horrific massacres, enforced repression, and incited sectarian hatred — particularly against minorities — while imposing a fascistic, racist, and reactionary rule.

One striking feature was the rapid transformation of HTS’s public discourse. Initially, they sought to reassure Syrians, declaring — through their top leaders — that “the ones who liberate get to decide” . Yet they maintained their insistence on a free-market economy and signed deals with international companies over Syria’s strategic resources, while avoiding any direct confrontation with imperialist powers or Israel (referred to explicitly as “the occupation state”).

At the same time, HTS pushed populist slogans like “Raise your head high, you are Syrian!” while cracking down on Islamist preachers they deemed “Wahhabi extremists.” They condemned behaviors they saw as religiously or socially deviant, yet themselves promoted sectarian and chauvinistic slogans such as “We are the Umayyads of Damascus” and “Judgment Day is near.”

HTS has also called for civilians — particularly in Syria’s coastal region — to hand over all weapons, under the pretext of “keeping arms solely in the hands of the state for public security and peace.” Many locals believed this and surrendered their weapons, only to see HTS launch violent raids, confiscating arms and intimidating communities — especially in Alawite areas.

In Damascus, shortly after assuming power, HTS began daily killings of civilians in Alawite neighborhoods. They claimed these were isolated incidents caused by “remnants of the old regime,” but they were accompanied by daily sectarian insults, harassment, and arbitrary arrests. In some cases, detainees were humiliated, tortured, paraded in public, made to crawl, and even forced to bark like dogs.

The scale of repression and hunger made it impossible for people to remain silent for long. On March 6, 2025, residents of the coastal Alawite areas staged a limited armed response against HTS checkpoints. These individuals were not old-regime loyalists, as HTS had claimed, but rather ordinary, oppressed locals. Many of these individuals were later absorbed into the new authorities’ own ranks.

HTS used the incident as a pretext for mass sectarian massacres against Alawite civilians, continuing until March 10, 2025, with horrifying images circulating widely on social media and in the press. Domestic and international condemnation grew, but HTS merely reduced the visibility of such killings, shifting to a “drip-feed” pattern of daily executions.

The strategy was clear: systematically terrorize the Syrian people, subjugate religious and ethnic minorities, and impose obedience through fear — all of which are pillars of fascist rule.

A month later, HTS extended its campaign to the Druze community, committing massacres in the coastal region and in the Damascus suburb of Ashrafiyat Sahnaya in April 2025, followed by further atrocities in May.

In June and July 2025, massacres in the Druze-majority province of Suwayda killed hundreds of civilians, along with cases of abduction, home burnings, and mass destruction — often carried out by Bedouin groups allied with HTS.

The people of Suwayda fought back heroically, inflicting a major defeat on HTS and even pushing them entirely out of the province — one of the few areas in Syria where the new regime lost control.
Despite this setback, HTS used the situation to invite Israeli intervention under the pretext of “restoring order,” thereby granting Israel further opportunities to expand its influence in southern Syria.

This policy of sectarian violence and ethnic targeting is a cornerstone of HTS’s fascist regime, which is built on intimidation, massacres, and genocide.

Toward Monopoly of Power

HTS moved quickly to consolidate its rule and tighten its grip on power.

On January 29, 2025, it convened what it called the “Victory Conference”, bringing together the leaders of its various armed factions. During this meeting, HTS announced the appointment of Ahmad al-Sharaa — the leader of HTS — as the Interim President of Syria.

Shortly after, HTS organized what it labeled the “National Dialogue Conference”, inviting around 600 people it had personally selected. The conference was held on February 25, with a limited duration and a small number of pre-prepared recommendations — no substantial debate occurred.

Then, in the midst of the peak massacres against Alawites in early March, HTS, under heavy regional and international pressure — especially from the United States — agreed to an arrangement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on March 13, 2025. The deal declared that all legislative, executive, and judicial powers would be centralized in the hands of a single person: Ahmad al-Sharaa. This interim period was announced to last five years — an extraordinarily long “transition” by historical standards — granting the new ruler powers exceeding those of many of the world’s most entrenched dictatorships.

On March 27, 2025, HTS announced the formation of the so-called General Secretariat for Public Affairs — a political body reporting to the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs” but functioning as the supreme decision-making authority over all political, economic, security, and military matters in the country.

The head of this General Secretariat — often referred to simply as “the Sheikh” — was a shadowy figure, usually without a known identity, and often holding no official position or title. Under its control were all the assets of the old regime’s National Progressive Front parties, which were dissolved, and their properties confiscated.

The General Secretariat’s founding document of the General Secretariat stated that its mission was to oversee and direct political activities across the country, draw up national plans, and reassign the assets of the dissolved Ba’ath Party and its allied organizations.

To implement its decisions, the Secretariat established branches in every governorate, effectively replacing youth and student organizations with six “central offices” — including the Office of Youth, Office of Women’s Affairs, Office of Syndicate Affairs, Office of Cultural and Political Affairs, Office of Community Development, and Office of Religious Affairs. Even social activities, such as anti-smoking campaigns or cultural festivals, required prior approval to ensure they aligned with “national values.”

On March 30, 2025, HTS announced the formation of a “government” for external marketing purposes — selecting individuals with no real authority, except for ministers in key portfolios like defense, interior, foreign affairs, and religious endowments, which remained under HTS leadership.

Despite these measures to centralize control, public protests continued — albeit in smaller numbers — against massacres, political repression, unpaid salaries for public sector employees and retirees, and the dismissal of workers from state institutions. Demonstrations also condemned the killing of Syrians, demanded equal citizenship rights, and opposed Israeli expansion in occupied Syrian territories.

HTS also sought to block any independent social or political organization. In the professional sector, efforts to establish trade unions for various occupations, such as workers, doctors, engineers, and lawyers, were expeditiously appropriated by appointing leaderships loyal to the establishment.

Some liberal and reformist political groups retreated, either out of fear or in the hope of gaining favor with the new regime. A coalition calling itself the “Syrian Citizenship Alliance — Tamasok” claimed to be neither opposition nor loyalist, and called for “dialogue with the authorities” — a stance that served to legitimize HTS’s monopoly of power.

Thermidorian Power

For some, Assad’s downfall appeared to mark the revolution’s victory, with the new authority seen as a product of revolutionary factions. This illusion was strengthened by the fact that HTS claimed the revolutionary mantle and monopolized its narrative, despite having played a major role in crushing it since 2012.

Understanding the nature of this new power requires placing it in the broader context of an aborted revolutionary process. Despite its blood-soaked record, neoliberal policies, and repressive practices, HTS presents itself as the heir to the 2011 popular revolution — while in reality it is run by many of the same types of criminals who served the old regime.

From a historical perspective, the events that transpired in Syria bear a striking resemblance to the Thermidor of the French Revolution in 1794. At that time, the conservative faction succeeded in overthrowing the revolutionary Jacobins, leading to the reversal of significant revolutionary gains.

The term “Thermidor” originates from the 9th of Thermidor Year II of the French Republican calendar (July 27, 1794), when Robespierre and other radical leaders were overthrown and executed. Since then, it has been used to describe reactionary counter-revolution within a revolutionary process.

Leon Trotsky, in his book on the “betrayed revolution,” used the term to describe Stalin’s rise to power as a “counter-revolution” that expressed deep political and social shifts — a retreat from the revolution’s radical phase, with its earliest leaders and militants being among the first victims.

According to the French historian François Furet described the Thermidorians as a group defined not by revolutionary ideals but by opportunistic self-interest — prone to factional disputes, corrupt deals, and a hunger for wealth and power, even as they continued to speak in the language of revolution.

In contemporary contexts, French researcher Jean-François Bayart compared this to post-revolutionary authoritarian regimes that emerge after the collapse of dictatorships — in places like Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia — which re-integrate into the global capitalist economy under contradictory strategies: using revolutionary rhetoric while promoting neoliberal economics and serving the interests of new elites.

From this perspective,  TS fits the Thermidorian model:

It arose from a defeated revolutionary process.
It built state structures serving its own private interests.
It integrated Syria’s economy into the global capitalist system.
It pursued neoliberal policies with no commitment to social justice.

Revolutionary Tasks in the Current Situation

More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, the Syrian people remain exhausted and fragmented by war, destruction, and defeat. The country’s social structures are shattered, and millions live in displacement — over three million in camps — while poverty dominates the lives of most Syrians under miserable conditions.

In the territories controlled by HTS, fascist practices prevail: massacres, physical and psychological violence, sectarianism, and complete subservience to the will of imperialist powers. HTS believes that obedience to global and regional powers — particularly Turkey and the Gulf states — will secure its survival, even promoting reconstruction as a multi-hundred-billion-dollar “cake” to be divided among international investors.

But neoliberal policies will only deepen social injustice. HTS’s violent, sectarian incitement — targeting Alawites, Druze, Christians, and even non-Salafi Sunnis — has fueled widespread resentment and opposition, especially as it also attacks women’s rights, individual freedoms, and the equality of all citizens.

Meanwhile, in areas outside HTS control, such as the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, distrust of HTS has grown. The Suwayda region, after repelling HTS forces, remains a symbol of resistance. Despite harsh conditions, democratic, leftist, and civil forces continue to operate in these regions — organizing political, cultural, and protest activities.

HTS’s violent, sectarian incitement — targeting Alawites, Druze, Christians, and even non-Salafi Sunnis — has fueled widespread resentment and opposition

Citat: Revolutionary Left Current in Syria

Given this reality, there is no alternative but to work on all the issues that matter to the Syrian masses: ending violence, opposing sectarianism and racism, defending democracy and citizenship rights, resisting imperialism and occupations, and fighting for social justice and equality.

Our common task is to build united fronts that link struggles across all regions of Syria — with the goal of challenging and overthrowing the Thermidorian authority in favor of a democratic, non-sectarian, decentralized republic for all Syrians as equal citizens.

To achieve this, revolutionary forces must double their efforts — organizing effectively, expanding their presence in popular struggles, and building a revolutionary workers’ party rooted in the masses. This party must fight for a radical political and social transformation toward a democratic, egalitarian, and just society.

As in 2011, the driving forces of change remain the working class and toiling popular classes, in both urban and rural areas.

July 2025