المصائر المحتملة للمناطق الثلاث في سوريا

The possible destinies of the three regions of Syria

Although it is true to say that a rational and scientific analysis of reality, despite its contradictions, may allow to foresee its course and prospects, but it must be recognized in advance that, nevertheless, it remains subject to miscalculation in accurately predicting what the future will be. In particular, there is a subjective factor, which is difficult to assess decisively, the wills and choices made by the social and political forces influencing it. This applies, despite our attempt to capture the active dynamics as much as possible, to our assessment of the destinies of the three regions in Syria: the regime-controlled areas, the northwestern regions of Syria and the northeastern regions of Syria. But the importance of such an appreciation of the future stems from the fact that it touches on the fate and future of our country, Syria itself.

What makes this even more difficult is the complex, tangled and crumbling Syrian reality itself. The Syrian reality suffers from the multiplicity of countries intervening militarily in it, which, despite their different interests, have been working so far to organize their competition among themselves. This reality also suffers from the defeat of most of the Syrian political forces, which are characterized by their short-sightedness, poor practices and opportunism. The general Syrian people suffers from the dispersion and displacement of Syrians, their difficult situation and their severe poverty, all on the basis of the defeat of the 2011 revolution.

In addition to all the objective factors mentioned, there is an important factor that is absent from most Syrian political perceptions, which, in our opinion, is the most effective key element in the ability to make the future of our country in the hands of the Syrian people themselves and not in the hands of others, is the need to promote the popular movement again organized and conscious at the national level, benefiting from the experiences and lessons of past years. As for its timing, it depends on the objective circumstances mentioned and the weakness of the subjective factor, so it remains difficult to predict the timing of the change in the mood of the Syrian masses, from relative acquiescence to the current reality to their revolutionary rejection of it, in the coming days.

Nevertheless, there are signs of a shift from its general passivity to revolutionary surges in its mood, we see its first signs in the protests in Sweida and Idlib in northwestern Syria.

Since reality is always changing and carries its contradictions within it, and because the political and social conflict cannot be approached as a simple mathematical equation but are closer to algebraic equations, for this it is necessary to approach it as a science and art at the same time, allowing on the relevant grounds the correctness of weighting this or that path. This means that the choice of this or that path should not be arbitrary or experimental. Because its results can be disastrous.
Proceeding from the above, the task of reuniting the country on new foundations with a decentralized democratic system and social justice is one of the central tasks assigned to us, because the current division of Syria into three regions and the continuation of this division for a long time will have major disastrous consequences for Syrians, their future and their country.

As it stands, it can be said that the three areas of the Syrian division, despite their different nature, are, by force of facts, anxious, unstable and transitional areas whose long-term destruction, as it is today, is difficult to imagine.

To begin with, the most likely scenario for the fate of the northwestern regions of Syria, which are under the Turkish occupation and the control of the terrorist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, is to end up with one of two possibilities; we find a lot of transformations that are likely to them, the first of which is the biting and merging of that region with Turkey, and the second possibility is its return to the authority (bosom) of the regime, and what may be more likely one of these two possibilities over the other are the results that will result from Continuous Contacts and understandings between the regime and its allies, on the one hand . And Turkey, on the other hand. In the latter case, some of Turkey’s opposition figures will be integrated into the “national unity” government of the junta regime according to a recipe for sectarian division, a scenario of a permanent civil war. So, both possibilities are negative in terms of the general interests of the Syrian people and their sacrifices for liberation, and the fate of the rescue and interim governments will disappear.

While the regime, which controls the largest area of Syria, monopolizes the international representation of the” Syrian state”, it is the most adapted to this geographical and demographic division and to the current situation, waiting for circumstances to change in its favor. It does not seem that he is in a hurry, rather, he does not want to make fundamental concessions to reunify the country and achieve a “political” transition, especially with the clinical death of Resolution 2254, which the Liberal oppositions cling to, but the number of indications is increasing that the junta regime is raising the pace of measures to strengthen its power through restructuring its security, Party and economic apparatuses. Nevertheless, it has been exposed more and more as a tyrannical regime in favor of a narrow minority associated with it and its survival, while the majority of Syrians suffer from deprivation, oppression and poverty in its areas and the public’s restlessness and grumbling increases every day, which makes it itself in a situation that remains critical and fragile.

As for the regions of north-eastern Syria, namely the areas of democratic self-administration, where a progressive project for Syrians is taking place despite some stumbling blocks facing it, in addition to the ongoing Turkish war on it, the siege and threats to it from several parties.

The mood of some people there seems to be softening on the issue of the stay or exit of American troops. She is worried about any news about her departure, which means that there is an imminent danger of the regime returning to her or an imminent Turkish invasion. Or she gets some kind of relief when she hears statements about the survival of American troops. This situation, along with others, is an indicator of people’s deep concern about its future. It may also hinder the deepening of building policies that serve the Syrian masses in the region or directing clear and effective speeches and policies towards all Syrian masses in all regions. In this regard, the announcement of the preparation of municipal elections in the autonomous administration areas in a democratic manner next month may constitute, by providing conditions for broad and free popular participation, an important turning point in enhancing the participation of the masses and a concrete development of the autonomous administration project to consolidate and develop it, making it, with policies and rhetoric expressing the interests of all the Syrian masses, a vivid and typical experience for all Syrians, expanding their sympathy for it and the disintegration of the popular chauvinism and making its existence, objectively, a major obstacle to the attempt of the junta regime to reproduce itself. By doing so, it becomes a difficult figure in the Syrian situation that repels and discourages the possibility of imposing deals between the occupied countries at the expense of the interests of the Syrian people and its sovereignty.

From this perspective, it is possible to read, in the light of the above conditions, that the autonomous administration, with its specificity as a unique democratic project in Syria, and as has been done in its previous initiatives, clearly addresses the entire Syrian people, calling for opening the door to “negotiation” with the regime on principled grounds and with the current balance of forces to achieve three goals; the first is peace and improving the living conditions of Syrians, the second; achieving a real and deep democratic transition, allowing the reunification of the country and providing its independence and sovereignty free from occupation; third.

If the junta is expected to reject or circumvent that, as is its usual practice. This may embarrass the regime and expose it, once again, in front of its “incubator”, and reveal, if there is a need to reveal what has become a reality, the fact that the junta regime is not really interested in improving the lives of the population in its regions, and is not interested in reunifying the country, on new grounds. On the other hand, this approach may stop, or at least hinder, the acceleration of the rapprochement deal between the junta regime and Turkey. This is what poses the greatest dangers to the North and east of Syria, which remains a pillar of the democratic struggle.

However, whatever the scenarios of the “political solution” in Syria, if such a solution is achieved through deals between the occupied countries in Syria, even if it is carried out with the participation of elites and the official opposition, the results will not be for the benefit of the Syrian people and their future. Most likely, such a “political” solution will be limited to preserving the interests of the intervening countries in Syria, and to formal changes to the existing regime that preserve the same socio-economic policies destructive to the lives of the majority of Syrians, in addition to sectarian power sharing.

What can change such scenarios, give tremendous strength to the best of them and open up a wider horizon to achieve a broader future for the Syrian people in which a decentralized democratic system is achieved in a free, independent and unified Syria with equality and social justice, is the rise of a broad, organized and conscious Democratic Popular Movement along the Syrian geography and in the diaspora to achieve this goal, capable of actually relying on a fulcrum of self-administration. This condition must exist, and it requires the availability of Democratic, radical left-wing and mass-strong political forces, based on the mentioned pillar of the democratic struggle. If the latter is available, the former is still in the process of preliminary introductions.

The Revolutionary Left movement in Syria
May/May 2024